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Interest	group	access	to	Commission	expert	groups
varies	substantially	across	policy	areas
The	access	of	interest	groups	to	the	European	Commission	has	important	implications	for	the
legitimacy	of	the	EU	policy	process.	Yet	there	is	a	widely	held	assumption	that	groups	representing
specific	interests,	such	as	business	associations,	are	likely	to	enjoy	greater	access	than	those
representing	‘diffuse’	interests,	such	as	environmental	and	consumer	organisations.	Drawing	on	new
research,	Carl	Vikberg	explains	that	although	there	is	some	broad	evidence	for	this	assumption,	the
picture	varies	substantially	across	different	policy	areas.
Interest	group	access	to	the	European	Commission	is	often	claimed	to	be	favourable	to	groups	representing
specific	interests,	like	business	associations,	but	unfavourable	to	groups	representing	broader	diffuse	or	public
interests,	like	environmental	or	consumer	organisations.	For	example,	scholars	have	established	that	interest
groups	representing	specific	interests	gain	more	access	to	the	Commission	than	do	groups	representing	diffuse
interests,	and	civil	society	organisations	and	trade	unions	have	voiced	concern	over	‘big	business’	bias	in
Commission	expert	groups.	Scholarly	explanations	of	specific	interests’	higher	degree	of	access	typically	suggest
that	they	possess	more	technical	expertise	than	diffuse	interests	do,	and	that	the	Commission	demands	this
technical	expertise	to	initiate	effective	policy.
Yet	empirical	findings	indicate	that	interest	group	access	to	the	Commission	may	be	more	complex	than	this
narrative	suggests.	For	example,	research	has	found	that	access	to	Commission	expert	groups	in	the	Directorate-
General	(DG)	Enterprise	and	Industry	favours	specific	interest	groups,	whereas	access	to	expert	groups	in	DG
Health	and	Consumer	Protection	favours	neither	specific	interest	groups	nor	diffuse	interest	groups.	What	can
account	for	these	variations	in	access?
I	sought	to	gain	traction	on	this	question	by	analysing	the	relative	access	of	specific	and	diffuse	interest	groups	in
all	Commission	expert	groups	with	interest	group	participants.	For	each	of	these	223	expert	groups,	I	coded	interest
group	participants	as	specific	or	diffuse	interests.	Organisations	representing	a	constituency	with	a	clear	role	in	the
production	process,	like	business	associations	or	trade	unions,	were	coded	as	specific	interests,	while
organisations	representing	a	cause	that	is	not	explicitly	tied	to	the	self-interest	of	their	members,	or	a	constituency
without	a	clear	role	in	the	production	process,	were	coded	as	diffuse	interests.	I	then	calculated	the	proportion	of
diffuse	interest	groups	relative	to	all	specific	and	diffuse	interest	groups,	mapped	this	proportion	across	policy
areas,	and	assessed	potential	drivers	of	variation	across	expert	groups.
The	analyses	generated	two	principal	findings.	First,	in	line	with	the	conventional	narrative,	specific	interests	were
indeed	numerically	overrepresented	in	most	expert	groups.	Figure	1	illustrates	the	distribution	of	expert	groups
across	different	proportions	of	diffuse	interest	access,	where	a	value	of	1	indicates	an	expert	group	where	all
interest	group	participants	represent	diffuse	interests,	while	a	value	of	0	indicates	that	all	interest	group	participants
represent	specific	interests.	Most	expert	groups	gather	around	the	lower	end	of	this	spectrum.
Figure	1:	Share	of	diffuse	interests	in	expert	groups
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	Source:	Own	data	based	on	the	Commission’s	expert	group	register.
However,	there	were	also	substantial	variations	across	policy	areas,	as	illustrated	by	Figure	2.	Diffuse	interest
group	presence	was	particularly	high	in	expert	groups	addressing	civil	rights	issues,	social	policy,	and	regional
policy.	Specific	interests	had	a	particularly	high	presence	in	policy	areas	with	a	clear	economic	profile,	but	also	in
less	usual	suspects	like	law	and	crime,	immigration,	and	EU	governance.	Importantly,	however,	the	patterns	across
substantive	policy	areas	should	be	interpreted	with	caution,	since	several	policy	areas	contain	few	observations.
Figure	2:	Average	share	of	diffuse	interests	in	expert	groups	across	policy	areas
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Source:	Own	data	based	on	the	Commission’s	expert	group	register.
Second,	the	data	provided	support	for	two	potential	explanations	of	variations	in	diffuse	interest	access	across
expert	groups.	The	first	explanation	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	expert	groups	addressing	distributive	policies,
specifically	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy	and	cohesion	measures,	will	have	a	higher	share	of	diffuse	interests
than	those	addressing	regulatory	policies.	The	proposed	theoretical	rationale	here	is	that	the	distribution	of	gains
from	these	policies	is	particularly	visible	to	the	general	public,	which	incentivises	the	Commission	to	seek	out
information	from	diffuse	interest	groups	to	avoid	opposition.
The	second	explanation	assumes	that	expert	groups	run	by	newer	DGs	will	have	a	higher	share	of	diffuse	interest
groups	than	those	run	by	older	DGs.	The	proposed	theoretical	rationale	in	this	case	is	one	of	path	dependence,
according	to	which	older	DGs	were	established	at	a	time	when	the	Commission	was	generally	less	open	to	diffuse
interests,	and	whereby	access	patterns	that	privileged	specific	interests	have	taken	hold.	In	addition	to	these	two
explanations,	the	analyses	granted	limited	support	to	the	hypothesis	that	expert	groups	in	publically	salient	policy
areas	have	a	larger	share	of	diffuse	interests.
There	are	two	main	take-aways	from	these	findings.	First,	while	they	do	support	conventional	expectations	of
specific	interest	overrepresentation	in	access	to	the	Commission,	the	findings	nuance	the	technical	logic	often	used
to	explain	it.	The	data	show	extensive	variations	across	policy	areas,	and	expert	groups	in	policy	areas	where	the
distribution	of	gains	is	particularly	discernible	have	a	higher	share	of	diffuse	interest	participants.	This	supports
previous	findings	of	a	Commission	concerned	not	only	with	technical	expertise,	but	also	with	political	support
among	the	public.
Second,	while	empirical	patterns	say	nothing	about	whether	interest	group	access	is	‘biased’	in	a	normative	sense,
they	may	still	inform	normative	evaluations	of	interest	groups’	relative	access	to	expert	groups.	In	this	regard,	the
findings	paint	a	dual	picture.	On	the	one	hand,	specific	interest	groups	are	indeed	numerically	overrepresented	in
expert	groups.	This	may	be	concerning	for	someone	who	considers	the	average	representation	of	interests	across
all	types	of	policies	to	be	the	relevant	normative	unit	of	analysis.	On	the	other	hand,	there	are	extensive	variations
across	policy	areas,	and	some	limited	evidence	of	a	positive	association	between	public	salience	and	diffuse
interest	access.
This	may	hold	some	slight	promise	for	anyone	who	considers	it	normatively	desirable	that	diffuse	interest	access
should	be	higher	on	issues	the	public	consider	important.	However,	those	who	hold	this	position	would	most	likely
wish	for	stronger	evidence	of	an	association	between	salience	and	access.
For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	article	in	European	Union	Politics
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Gérard	Colombat	(CC	BY	2.0)
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